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government has initiated Shantytown Redevelopment Projects (SRPs) to improve 
the living conditions of low-income residents. Between 2008 and 2012, about 12.6 
million households were involved in SRPs, and forced to move as their dwellings were 









arise due to frictions between the central and local governments regarding the 
implementation of SRPs. We also find evidence of an entrepreneurial paradox in 
the relationship between local governments and developers. Finally, a mismatch 
occurs between the scope of the SRP policy and residents’ attempts to improve their 
socioeconomic situation.
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§  3.1 Introduction
Since 1978, China has undergone the process of market transition, which has led to a 






government enacted a regulation to suspend the public housing provision system. From 
then on, low-income residents who are not eligible for state (or state-owned enterprise) 
housing subsidies have very limited access to dwellings (Chen et al., 2014; Lee, 2000).
In 2008, parallel to the local government-initiated residential redevelopment projects, 
the Chinese central government initiated the first round of national Shantytown 
Redevelopment Projects (SRPs, Peng-hu-qu Gaizao in Pinyin). SRPs aim to improve 
the living conditions of low-income residents and to stimulate the depressed housing 
market. In China, the term shantytown (Peng-hu-qu) is widely used in government 
policies and refers to the dilapidated housing or illegally-constructed shanties in old 
inner cities, danwei1 communities, or run-down villages in (sub)urban and rural areas. 
There are some differences in what the term shanty(town) represents in the Chinese 
context and in other countries with regard to the concrete structure, construction 
materials, development history and the formal position of the shanty. For instance, 
regarding the development history and legality of the shanty, some of the shantytowns 
in China were planned and legally constructed by state-owned enterprises to reside 





China, this paper uses the term shantytown to refer to neighbourhoods or areas with a 
high concentration of physically run-down dwellings, which lack basic infrastructures 
such as gas and water (MOHURD, 2013a). While the year 2008 witnessed a new policy 
turn to shantytown redevelopment projects, these are by no means new. Since 1980s, 
some local governments such as Beijing have initiated neighbourhood redevelopment 
projects in the inner city which are featured by upgrading the physical conditions of the 
neighbourhoods (Fang and Zhang, 2003; Leaf, 1995). During the end of the 1990s 
and in the early 2000s, such redevelopment projects have evolved into larger-scale 
demolition of dwellings and forced relocation of residents from the inner city to sub-
urban areas (Fang and Zhang, 2003; He, 2012).
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Current SRPs in China involve the demolition of run-down neighbourhoods and 
the forced relocation of the residents. Between 2008 and 2012, about 12.6 million 
households were involved in the national SRPs (MOHURD, 2013a); their dwellings were 
demolished and they were forced to move. In 2013, the central government triggered 
a second round of SRPs, which focused especially on improving the living conditions 
of vulnerable residents in undesirable small scale urban areas. From 2008 to date, the 
neighbourhoods targeted for SRPs have changed from large-scale and well-positioned 





2015; Lin et al., 2014; Ong, 2007; Zhu, 1999). These stakeholders behave differently 









Meanwhile, evolving regulations for the urban housing demolition and relocation 
are changing the interrelationships between different actors in urban restructuring 
(Shih, 2010; Ren, 2014).




studies have been conducted on urban restructuring and residential upgrading projects 
in less popular areas for low-income residents, especially since the recession in the 
Chinese housing market after 2013. Also, most of the urban redevelopment projects 
examined in empirical studies were initiated by local governments or developers, 
and carried out within a certain time period. These studies document the position of 
different stakeholders in one particular institutional, economic and social context, and 
do not investigate changes in stakeholders’ roles over time.
This paper aims to investigate how the state-led SRPs are implemented in Shenyang 
and what this means to different stakeholders by revealing how different stakeholders 
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interact with each other, and how their roles have changed over time against the 
changing context. The paper is based on semi-structured interviews with different 
stakeholders involved in SRPs in Shenyang, including experts, governors, developers 
and residents. Shenyang is an old industrial city in Northeast China and is the capital 
city of Liaoning Province. The city is considered as a pioneer of SRPs in China. In 2005, 
Liaoning Province firstly initiated the SRPs at the provincial level in China. As the capital 
city of Liaoning Province, Shenyang had initiated large-scale demolition and forced 





success on SRPs (Shenyang Daily, 2016).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section locates different 
stakeholders within the context of market transition and urban restructuring in 
China. Then the research area, data and methods are described. Following this, the 
paper discusses the implementation of SRPs, and the changing roles and interaction 
between different stakeholders in SRPs in Shenyang. The last two sections present the 
discussion and conclusions respectively.
§  3.2 Urban restructuring under market transition in China
State-led redevelopment of declining (inner-city) neighbourhoods with a large social 
housing segment is often designed by governments around the globe to tackle issues 
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governments usually benefit from gentrification and revalorization of urban land 
(Goetz, 2016; Lees, 2012). Both in Europe and the United States, neo-liberalisation 
has greatly affect the governance of urban redevelopment policies (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002). Due to fiscal austerity and public deficits, national governments 
cut down social housing subsidies and invite private developers into social housing 
redevelopment, which can substantially moderate the outcome of social welfare 
delivery as the interests of low-income residents are often marginalised for the 
achievement of general economic growth (Goetz, 2016; Marom and Carmon, 2015). 
Although some collaborative governance between governments, residents, and 
private developers is promoted in Western European countries such as the UK and 
the Netherlands, the national state often still plays a significant role in shaping and 
implementing the policies and redevelopment (Dodson, 2006). Compared with the 
Western cities, the role of the state on urban (re)development in East Asian cities might 
be even more apparent and outstanding (Shin et al., 2016). In East Asia, the strong 
state intervention both exists in economic development and social welfare policy 
delivery, and it cooperates or mobilises market forces to achieve capital accumulation 
via space reproduction such as ‘slum’ clearance and forced relocation or residents, 
under the joint effects of East Asian histories (e.g. colony or socialist legacy) and the 
recent global economic and political trends such as democratisation, decentralization, 
neoliberalization, etc. (Shin et al., 2016). This has led to the disparities of the position 
of different actors during urban redevelopment, featured by the advantaged position 
of the state and capitalists and the disadvantaged position of the affected residents on 
mobilising urban resources such as land ownership, institutions, policy practises, etc. 








governing a ‘totalitarian society’ or ‘authoritarian society’ to ‘ruling from afar’ (Wu, 
2008; Zhang and Ong, 2008). However, other scholars argue that the term neo-
liberalization cannot be applied to the Chinese context, because the political and 
economic developmental path of China has never included liberalisation, and hence 
there cannot be neo-liberalization (Nonini, 2008). Regardless of the dispute about 
whether China has become neo-liberal or not, the process of market transition has 
influenced the logic, processes and governance arrangements between different actors 
in urban redevelopment projects (Lee and Zhu, 2006; Lin, 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Zhang, 
2002; Zhu, 1999). In the socialist era, the state took public housing provision as an 
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inherent duty, and state-owned enterprises or other state organizations provided their 
employees with highly subsidized housing. In the post-reform era, a commodity housing 
market was established. Currently, access to housing in China is largely dependent on 
a household’s income and status and whether people qualify for subsidized housing 




al., 2014; Lee, 2000; Meng, 2012; Ni et al., 2012). This inequality in housing has been 




2007; Wu, 2008, 2010; Stephens, 2010). The central government has adopted social 
and political stability and economic development as the underlying principles for the 
formulation of policy direction, and it will intervene the market transition process if 




and boosting the economy (Chen et al., 2014; Stephens, 2010).
At the same time, within the one-party system, the relationship between the central 
and local governments in China has shifted. Generally speaking, local governments 
are supposed to follow the central government’s directives for projects such as public 
housing construction (Wang et al., 2012). Despite hierarchical governance, there is 
asymmetrical decentralization of power and responsibility, and local governments are 
reluctant to invest in public housing sectors which has caused public housing projects 
to lag behind (Lin, 2014; Stephens, 2010; Xu and Yeh, 2009). Fiscal and economic 
reforms have given local governments more autonomy in economic activities, and 
also increased the pressure to generate more fiscal revenue for the provision of public 
services (Chen et al., 2014; Chien, 2007; Lin, 2014). Motivated by economic growth, 
the need to upgrade urban image and career aspiration of governments cadres, 





society (such as developers and residents) are also involved in urban restructuring. In 
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many cases, local governments and developers have held a dominant position in urban 
redevelopment (He and Wu, 2005; Shin, 2009; Zhang, 2002), while residents are more 
disadvantaged and marginalised (Ren, 2014; Shih, 2010; Shin, 2014). Sometimes 
even the compensation criteria have not been transparent to local residents, and 
residents have often been excluded from the decision-making process (He and 
Wu, 2005; Yang and Chang, 2007: 1822). Conflicts between local governments 
or developers and homeowners constantly arise due to disagreement on urban 
redevelopment projects and compensation (He, 2012; Hin and Xin, 2011; Si-chuan 
News, 2009; Shao, 2013).
SRPs are generally initiated and implemented by governments to improve the living 
conditions of low-income residents of declining neighbourhoods. Local governments 
select the targeted neighbourhoods for SRPs. These neighbourhoods are demolished 












describes our research approach, data and methods.
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§  3.3 Research area, data and method
Most of the research on urban redevelopment in China focuses on eastern coastal cities 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Our case study is Shenyang in Northeast 
China, a typical old industrial city. Shenyang has a population of 5.25 million (Shenyang 
Statistic Bureau, 2014), making it the largest city in Northeast China and the 11th largest 





Urban areas, especially those traditional industrial areas occupied by state-owned 
enterprises and danwei communities, became problematic areas. Shenyang, had – and 
still has – a lot of industrial workers and danwei communities. In addition, there are 
many urban villages located in the suburban areas. The physical conditions of these 
neighbourhoods have severely deteriorated (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
FIGURE 3.1 The internal dwelling condition of a 
danwei community
Source: authors
FIGURE 3.2 The main road of a urban village
Source: authors
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Since the 1990s, the municipal authority of Shenyang has implemented several 
SRPs to improve the living conditions of its citizens. Shenyang is the capital city of 
Liaoning Province, which is the first province to implement SRPs at the provincial level, 
a development strategy pursued by Premier Li when he was the Governor of Liaoning 
Province. As the capital city of Liaoning Province, Shenyang has been a pioneer in SRPs 
in the province (see also section 3.1). Shenyang is therefore a very interesting case 
study for investigating changes in governance arrangements in SRPs over time. Table 
3.1 shows the housing conditions in Shenyang in 2010. There are still thousands of 
households living in dwellings that lack basic facilities such as tap water and private 




HOUSING FACILITIES FLOORS BUILDING 
YEARS




5,913 31,510 114,426 25,422 177,061 23,582
Proportion
(household)
2.1% 11.1% 40.5% 9.5% 62.6% 8.3%
Source: Based on the Population Census Data in Shenyang 2010(Shenyang Statistic Bureau, 2010).









1 Governor SRPs + Land Expropriation Department 10 Developer Private Real Estate Company
2 Governor SRPs + Land Expropriation Department 11 Developer Private Real Estate Company
3 Governor Land Expropriation Department 12 Expert Land Expropriation Company
4 Governor Land Expropriation Department 13 Expert Land Expropriation Company
5 Governor Land Expropriation Department 14 Expert Scholar
6 Governor Land Expropriation Department 15 Expert Scholar
7 Governor Land Expropriation Department 16 Expert Scholar
8 Planner Urban Planning and Design Institute 17 Expert Scholar
9 Developer Private Real Estate Company
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The empirical basis for this paper consists of (analysis of) policy documentation and 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted in March, April, May, September and 
October 2015. We approached governors, planners, developers and scholars via email, 
personal introduction or the local government’s official channels (see Table 3.2). As 
part of a larger research study on SRPs in Shenyang, we also interviewed residents 
living in a selection of shantytowns, which are among the target areas of the SRP plans 
of Shenyang (Figure 3.3). Both danwei communities and urban villages were involved 
in the field work (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). We recruited these resident respondents 
through a combination of snowball sampling and door knocking. Some respondents 

























FIGURE 3.3 Shenyang and the locations of the case study areas in Shenyang
Source: Authors.
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TABLE 3.3 Basic information of the resident respondents
CATOGERY GENDER AGE (YEAR) LENGTH OF RESIDENCE (YEAR)
Male Female Un-
known
30-60 60-80 ≥80s Un-
known




29 29 6 21 28 4 11 8 22 17 9 8




FIGURE 3.5 The main road of a urban village
Source: Authors
All the interviews were conducted face-to-face using a semi-structured interview 
schedule which varied according to type of respondent. The questions posed to 





the SRPs, impending demolition and neighbourhood changes, their family and moving 
history, their moving intentions, residential satisfaction, etc.
In total, 81 interviews were conducted, including 17 interviews with scholars, 
governors, planners and developers, and 64 interviews with residents. Among the 
interviews with residents, 33 were conducted in danwei communities and 31 were 
conducted in urban villages. The interviews with governors, developers, planners and 
experts were recorded by making notes. The interviews of residents, with the exception 
of four (because the author did not get permission to record the interview), were 
recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim, enabling content analysis of the 
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transcriptions. Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the resident respondents. 
Most of them have been living in their declining neighbourhoods for more than 20 
years. The interviewed residents who are older than 55 are retired and can get a 
pension ranging around from 1800 to 3000 RMB/month. Those respondents who 
are aged between 30 and 55 either have part-time jobs or are self-employed. Many of 
them are homeowners who can rent out rooms to migrants and earn around 200 RMB 
per month per room. Many young and more affluent residents have moved out of these 
neighbourhoods. The stayers are mostly middle-aged residents with a low or middle 
income. There are also many migrants living in these neighbourhoods. In 2015, the 
annual average disposable income for the lowest and lower income households are 
14679 RMB and 23944 RMB respectively (Shenyang Statistic Bureau, 2016). However, 
the average selling price of commercialized residential dwellings is 6416 RMB per 
square meter (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). In general, it is relatively 
difficult for these lowest – and lower income residents to afford the dwellings.
Before using Atlas.ti to analyse the transcriptions, the notes and recordings were 




respective function and interviewing date. Alongside the interviews, we analysed 
relevant policy documentation on SRPs in general and their implementation in our 
case study area in particular. Figure 3.3 shows the map of Shenyang as well as the case 
study neighbourhoods (involved in SRPs).
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§  3.4 Implementation and changes in roles of stakeholders 
in SRPs in Shenyang
§  3.4.1 The centralization of the inception of SRPs
There is a tendency towards centralization in Shenyang’s SRPs with regard to initiating 
projects, raising funds and expropriating land. As Table 3.4 shows, SRPs in Shenyang 
used to be initiated by the municipality. The central government has taken over this 
role from 2013 onwards. Since the 1980s, Shenyang has seen some local-state 
initiated residential redevelopment projects (Guo and Sun, 2010). In 2000, Shenyang 
municipality initiated a large-scale SRP, and emphasized redeveloping shantytowns 
and land at market prices (Guo and Sun, 2010: 110). In 2005, the then Governor of 
Liaoning Province launched a provincial-wide SRP programme, incorporating SRPs into 
its provincial-level development strategy for the first time. Shenyang was encouraged by 
the policies of the provincial authority, to implement larger-scale SRPs in the following 








central government’s promotion of a second round of SRPs. In order to motivate local 
governments and get them involved in SRPs, the central government repeatedly stressed 
the importance of SRPs as the key to economic growth and the welfare of residents 









the targeted neighbourhoods from inner-city neighbourhoods to shanty villages at the 
urban periphery (Respondent 8, 18-03-2015; Respondent 1, 30-03-2015).
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TABLE 3.4 The centralization process of SRPs in Shenyang




STRATEGY ADOPTED IN 
SHENYANG
2001-2004 Shenyang City City-level residential 
upgrading projects; the 
pace of SRPs was accel-
erated since the central 
government launched 
the “Revitalization of the 
Northeast old industrial 
bases programme” in 
2003
Large scale; spatially con-
centrated, relatively good 
location from a housing 
market perspective
Projects are operated 
according to market 
mechanisms, and 
supported by the various 
governments
2005-2008 Liaoning Province SRPs listed as the chief 





2009-2012 The central government “Urban shantytown 
redevelopment” was 
first mentioned in the 
national policy and on the 
agenda of national public 
housing; involving a RMB 
4 trillion worth of invest-
ment in infrastructure 
construction since the 
global financial crisis.
-
2013-2017 The central government Shantytown redevel-
opment projects have 
become more indepen-
dent projects






Sources: based on own interview materials and policy documents referenced in section 3.4.1.
Through other related interventions, the central government controls the crucial 
factors for the implementation of SRP: capital (funds) and land, which ensures that 
local governments align their development strategies within the agenda of the central 
government to obtain more financial and policy support. Since 2011, the central 
government has enacted several policies related to funds, urban space and land 
expropriation. We explain three policies in more detail.
The first policy concerned the land (re)development patterns. It emphasized compact 
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support from the central government to promote SRPs. Funds for Shenyang’s SRPs 
originate from different-level governments and the China Development Bank (CDB3). 
Up to 2015, Shenyang has received RMB 73.11 million (around €10 million) in funds 
from the central government, intended for compensating residents in SRPs. The 
CDB further provided Shenyang RMB 12.2 billion for SRPs in 2015 and 2016, which 
accounts for almost 80%of the total investment that Shenyang requires.
Third, the central government instructs local governments to regulate the land 
expropriation process through legislation and regulations. In 2007, the central 
government enacted the Property Rights Law which highlights the protection of private 
properties. In 2011, the central government abolished the No. 305 regulation on 
land expropriation (issued in 2001) which implies the legality of forced demolition 
on private properties, but contradicts the Property Rights Law (The State Council 
of PRC, 2001; Weinstein and Ren, 2009). At the same time, the new regulation on 
land expropriation (No. 590) was issued to standardize the conversion of property 
ownership and land-use rights from homeowners to local governments in public-use 
projects. These changes show the centralization in local urban (re)developments.
§  3.4.2 The decentralization of SRP implementation
Parallel to the centralization of the inception of SRPs, the implementation of SRPs 
has become more decentralized over time. This is partly due to the institutional 
arrangements of the central government and Liaoning Province. In China, the 
administrative structure in urban areas is multi-layered: municipal government, 
district-level governments and sub-district governments. District-level governments 
are a lower level than municipal governments. In turn, municipal government is 
affected by the regulations from the central and provincial governments.
In 2011 the central government abolished the old regulation (No. 305) on demolishing 
urban housing, and issued a new one (No. 590) emphasizing the expropriation of 
state-owned land for public use. The new regulation highlights the district-level 
governments’ duty in urban redevelopment (see Figure 3.6.1 and 3.6.3). The decision-
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making on land expropriation therefore has devolved from the Shenyang municipal-
level government to the district-level governments. In 2013, Liaoning Province 
introduced a policy to devolve more power to district-level governments with regard to 
project management, urban planning, land-use management and land expropriation. 
At about the same time, Shenyang municipality adopted a policy which emphasized 
the leading role of district-level governments in implementing SRPs. Due to the above 
changes, district-level governments are empowered with more autonomy on decisions 
about the duration of the transitional period, the criteria for compensation and the 
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The era of the No. 305 regulation (2001-2011) The era of the No. 590 regulation (2011 to now)
FIGURE 3.6 Changes in the land expropriation process: Regulations No. 305 & No. 590
Sources: Based on regulations No. 305 (The State Council of PRC, 2001) and No.590 (The State Council of PRC, 2011).
However, these changes pose multiple challenges to district-level governments. 
First, district-level governments need to deal with relocatees’ multiple deprivation 
situation (usually including a combination of poverty, unemployment, low-income, 
disability, etc.) and their decreasing housing affordability in the context of the second-
round national SRPs (see section 3.4.4). Current SRP merely focuses on the physical 
improvement of residents’ living conditions and adopts single compensation criteria. 
Therefore, it has limited influence on alleviating these relocatees’ multiple deprivation 
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process. It also empowers residents to be involved in the decision-making of SRPs. For 
instance, before the actual redevelopment starts, local governments have to make sure 
that residents sign the redevelopment agreement. Residents are also allowed to choose 
the real estate assessment company which sets the compensation criteria by assessing 
the value of residents’ dwellings, whereas local governments used to nominate these 
companies. These changes have become necessary procedures required by current land 
expropriation policy. District-level governments therefore have to make efforts to adapt 





developers are the main source of funding for SRPs (see section 3.4.1 and 3.4.3). Local 
governments mainly play an intermediary role, which enables the land to transfer from 
residents to the developers. However, due to the housing market recession and low 
financial capacity of relocatees, local governments have to rely on different types of 
loans and subsidies from the central, provincial and municipal-level of governments 
and the CDB. Nevertheless, the central government recently published a regulation 
to control the risk of the local governments’ debt, which makes it difficult for local 
governments to raise funding by pledging urban land to banks (Respondent 1, 15-04-
2015 and Respondent 2, 07-04-2015).
Despite the above challenges, district-level governments adopted different strategies 
in practice to accommodate their economic interests with the public interest involved 
in SRPs. For instance, a district-level government in Shenyang consolidated small-scale 
projects into larger ones in the redevelopment of a small scale and spatially scattered 
shanty neighbourhood (People’s Daily, 2013). Also, district-level governments can 






from SRPs. Therefore, this mismatch between local governments’ internal and the 
external motivation can lead to an inefficient implementation of SRPs. This also 
appears from the reports of many interviewed residents, who felt grateful about 
central government’s policy on SRP, but were dissatisfied with the implementation 
of SRP by the local governments. They remarked the policy and its implementation as 
‘the central government has good policies, but the local government have their own 
policy implementation’.
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Province’s SRPs during 2005-2006 shows that about RMB 1.9 billion (about €195.6 





“Currently developers are faced with more challenges and difficulties. This is because of 
the entire housing market situation [recession], rather than the [increasing] difficulty 
of land expropriation … The ‘golden decade’ of real estate development is over, and now 
it is the ‘silver era’ … Developers are less motivated to acquire more pieces of land.” 
(Respondent 9, 01-04-2015).
Figure 3.6 shows how the position and interaction between developers, residents and 
different-level governments have changed due to the changes in land expropriation 




compensating and rehousing residents. The institutional changes mentioned above 
have marginalised developers’ role in SRPs, and developers no longer directly initiate or 
finance SRPs as they did before. Since land expropriation is the most controversial part 
in SRPs, this marginalization might be beneficial for developers as they can get land 
directly transferred from local governments. Local governments seem to pave the way 
for developers by their directly taking part in the land expropriation process.
However, whether developers benefit from this will depend on the profit that they can 
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homeownership issues in declining neighbourhoods and the uncertainty of local 
governments’ project management. Moreover, neighbourhoods targeted for current 
SRPs are in poor locations and small-scale, making developers’ profit margins much 
less favourable compared with redevelopment of inner-city areas:
“Now developers are not interested in the [redevelopment of] shantytowns. 
[Developers] only focus on earning money” (Respondent 10, 01-04-2015). “If the 
location of shantytowns is good then it is good for developers… It costs too much to 
redevelop shantytowns [in poor locations]” (Respondent 9, 01-04-2015).
However, developers are not totally excluded from SRPs. They are indirectly taking part in 





§  3.4.4 Multiple deprivation and decreasing housing affordability of residents
The land expropriation process is the most controversial part in SRPs, as it requires 




the home in China. During the earlier SRPs in Shenyang, most relocatees had been living 
in declining neighbourhoods for many years. For these residents, SRP meant a chance 
to release and fulfil their suppressed housing demands, due to the underdevelopment 
of housing market and the lack of access to housing in the socialist era. Their housing 
needs and the compensation they were able to get from local governments and 
developers, and the relatively low housing price at that moment together boosted the 
pace of their relocation, because they were able to quickly secure alternative housing.
However, in the second round of SRPs, the social, economic and institutional context 




marriage in most cases, which was also reported by several interviewed residents.
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among the most deprived social groups. They encounter many hardships, such as 
unemployment, ageing, disability, etc. They can barely afford alternative housing, as 
the housing price in Shenyang has increased greatly.
Also, developers have become cautious about investing in SRPs. Local governments 
have become the overriding actor that these residents can rely on to improve their 
living conditions. Some respondents reported that they had visited the district-level 
governments to make an appeal for redevelopment for several times. For example, 
Qiang (58, male, disabled, with basic living allowance, 26-03-2015), who has been 
living in a shantytown for about 20 years, said that:
“I am alone now. My parents have passed away. I do have two sisters, but they have to 
take care of themselves. How could they really help me... I am happy with the forced 
relocation… [because] at least, whatever they [local governments] compensate me…, 
my future living condition definitely will be better than this…”






“…you [the government] have to save the residents from our sufferings... I am 
disabled… I make a living as a moto tricycle driver… [we] all want to cooperate [with 
the government]. But it is also quite important [the government] considers [our] real 
[difficult] situation, isn’t it?...”
Even if respondents now perceived SRPs as an opportunity to change their housing 
situation, many reported similar worries about the uncertainty of their life during and 
after SRPs (see also Li et al., 2016). These residents have developed living strategies 
over the long length of residence in their declining neighbourhoods. For instance, 
their neighbourhood can support them with an income by running small business or 
renting out rooms to migrants. They also retain their strong social networks within 
their neighbourhoods. These social and economic resources embedded in their 
neighbourhoods are significant resources for them to make a living. Partly for this 
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reason, they regard their neighbourhood as their home. Therefore, neighbourhood 
demolition and forced relocation involved in SRPs can be highly disruptive to these 
residents, because it amplifies the aforementioned ambivalent perceptions regarding 
SRPs. On the one hand, residents regard SRPs as congruent with their strong preference 
on improving their living condition via the redevelopment. On the other hand, the 
impending demolition and forced relocation may painfully emphasize the importance 
of their strong dependence on and attachment to their neighbourhoods with regard to 
coping with their life constraints.




and appeals of society (Lin and Zhang, 2014; Wu, 2010). The central government 
still plays a dominant role in guiding national activities of market transition in China. 
Since 1978, economic growth has become the overriding priority for different levels of 
governments. Poverty and heavy social burdens (e.g. housing, education and medical 
care) have been challenging social equality and social stability (Stephens, 2010). From 
the resurgence of public housing policies and the two rounds of SRPs since 2008, 
we can see that on the one hand, the state has been using investment in the public 
sector to cope with the global financial crisis and slow economic growth. On the other 
hand, the state has tried to maintain a balance between economic growth and social 
equality (Duckett, 2012; Li, 2015). While the concept neo-liberalisation cannot be 
applied properly to China (Nonini, 2008), scholars have observed a tendency of neo-





structuring and governing urban housing restructuring projects, which are especially 
significant for disadvantaged social groups and the least desirable residential areas 
(Dodson, 2006; Uitermark et al., 2007;). Although some Western European countries, 
such as the UK and the Netherlands, also retain control of public service delivery, most 
of their interventions are less direct compared with China (Dodson, 2006).
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There are also differences between China and the USA, which are partly caused by how 
neo-liberalisation has affected the governance of US urban redevelopment policies 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In China, local governments are both the implementer 
of top-down initiatives and also the key stakeholder with their own interest in SRPs. 
The entrepreneurial local governments have made economic growth and cadres’ career 
development as their priority. Therefore, local governments can mobilise various 
resources and state power to steer policy implementation for their own interests, which 
affects the interests of other stakeholders especially the residents (Duckett, 2012; Shin, 
2016; He, 2012). Paradoxically, this appears to pave the way for developers to become 
more selective regarding their participation in urban redevelopment projects. This 
applies to the USA as well (Jones and Popke, 2010). However, the countries again differ 






redevelopment policies relates to residents’ perception of the role of government 
layers. In China, many conflicts between local governments and residents have 
emerged during urban redevelopment (He, 2012; Hin and Xin, 2011). We found 
that many interviewed residents simultaneously report gratitude towards central 
government’s SRP policy and dissatisfaction with the implementation of SRP by 




involved in SRPs, facing demolition and forced relocation, are entitled to compensation 
from local governments. However, many scholars have criticized the unfairness of the 




willing to accept SRPs, achieving fair compensation and minimizing the disruptions 
connected to forced relocation have become the key issues for solving the tensions 
between residents and local governments.
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§  3.6 Conclusions
This paper has examined how SRPs are implemented in Shenyang and what this means 
over time for the interactions between and changing roles of the central government, 
local governments, developers and residents during the SRP. It found that the 
implementation of SRPs showed a tendency towards centralization in providing funds, 
initiating projects and governing land. At the same time, the implementation of SRPs 
has become more decentralized and an increasing mismatch appears between the 
SRPs’ focus on physical improvement versus the ability of target area residents to escape 
worsening living conditions and deteriorating housing affordability. In light of the wider 
international debate on state-led redevelopment of declining neighbourhoods, several 







and controversial parts of SRP implementation, local governments, who appear to 
behave increasingly entrepreneurial (cf. Cartier, 2013; Duckett, 2012; Shin, 2016), 





in many European countries that focus on disadvantaged social groups in the least 
desirable residential areas (see e.g. Lelévrier, 2013; Uitermark et al., 2007).
Another similarity between redevelopment in China, the USA and Europe concerns 
residents’ entitlement to compensation in case of demolition and forced relocation 
(Korthals Altes, 2016). However, scholars have criticized the unfairness of the 
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report gratitude towards central government’s SRP policy, which is supposed to provide 
them with an opportunity to provide their housing and living conditions, they reveal 
strong dissatisfaction with the implementation of SRP by local governments. This ‘split’ 
of the state, in terms of a “benign centre and a predatory local apparatus” (So, 2007, p 
560) has, to our knowledge, no counterpart in European or American neighbourhood 
redevelopment policies, where residents’ opposition is usually targeted towards local 
governments only (Goetz, 2016; Kleinhans and Kearns, 2013).
In the context of Chinese market transition, governments, and especially the central 
government, continue to be obliged to provide social services for the public, and to take 
both people’s wellbeing and economic growth into account (Li, 2015). This paper has 
shown the necessity of making corresponding governance arrangements and design 
operational practices which boost the smoothness of SRPs, as these are becoming more 
firmly entrenched in China. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation system, focussing 
on the social, economic and physical implications of SRPs for residents, should be 
established by the central government to assess local governments’ performance on 
SRPs. Not only the pace or the scale of the SRPs should be taken into account, but also 
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line from the central government about supporting and managing the funding for urban SRPs). Avail-
able at http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/2012wg/wg201210/201302/
t20130204_731904.html
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